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Under increasing pressure from women's rights groups and
other reform organizations, the Michigan legislature has
re-evaluated its centenarian rape statute,1 found it inadequate for
the realities of the mid-twentieth century,2 and enacted a new
sexual assault actO While people may refer to the act as "the new
rape law," it should be noted at the outset that the statute is
intended to prohibit a variety of sexual acts which involve crimi-
nal assault.
Michigan's new criminal sexual assault law was formulated to
distinguish among degrees of violence as motivated by hostility
rather than passion; rape, like other crimes, is more heinous in
certain contexts than others. The new law acknowledges that
criminal sexual conduct is generally a premeditated crime of vio-
lence rather than a crime provoked by the victim's behavior. The
victim is no longer required to resist. Where force is used, it is
now presumed that the victim did not consent. Similarly, evidence
is limited to that which applies to the specific crime rather than
evidence concerning the victim's past sexual behavior. This note
will analyze the specific provisions of the new bill and discuss the
policies behind the evidentiary changes.
1. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The new rape law could almost be described as "vic-
*[The official name of the new statute is the Criminal Sexual Conduct Act. Law
enforcement agencies will probably refer to it by its acronym, CSC. The official name has
been avoided in this note because the element of assault is common to all acts prohibited
under the new law. Additionally, nonassaultive criminal sexual behavior remains the
subject of other Michigan statutes; therefore, the new statute is referred to herein as the
Sexual Assault Act to emphasize its scope and purpose.]
1 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.520 (1967). This law was originally enacted in 1846. While
it has been periodically amended, it is still substantially the same law as that on the books
100 years ago.
2 See 1973 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE U.S., issued by Clarence M. Kelley.
Director, FBI, [hereinafter cited as "FBI REPORTS"]. Since 1968, the volume of reported
offenses has increased 42 percent for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 47 percent
for aggravated assault, and 62 percent for forcible rape. For 1973 murder and
non-negligent manslaughter increased 5 percent, aggravated assault 7 percent, and forcible
rape 10 percent.
3 No. 226 Mich. Public Acts [1974], 77th Sess. (effective April I. 1975), amending No,
328 Mich. Public Acts [19311, MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 750.1.568 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as "Sexual Assault Act"].
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tim-initiated." In the last two or three years several rape coun-
seling centers have been founded in various cities throughout the
state. 4 The primary purpose of these centers is to provide some
psychological backup and reassurance for the ever-increasing
number of rape victims. However, at a conference attended by
counselors of rape victims in June 1973, attention was drawn to
the fact that their efforts to help rape victims were seriously
hampered by the rape laws then in effect After a meeting with
the Michigan House Judiciary Committee in October 1973, it was
evident that any drive for new rape legislation would have to be
catalyzed by outside interest groups. 6 This prompted efforts to
enlist the aid of the legal community of Ann Arbor, Michigan.
7
These groups assisted in drafting the bill which its initial
sponsors 8 introduced in the Michigan Senate on February 28,
1974. 9 Despite objections to the evidentiary provisions in the
bill,10 a new statute closely resembling the submitted bill was
signed into law on August 12, 1974.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
A. Clarification of Terms
The new law for the first time has codified definitions which
may be determinative of the defendant's guilt or innocence-such
as what constitutes "intimate parts" of the body, when a person is
"4mentally defective" or "physically helpless," what type of "per-
sonal injury" may be grounds for a higher charge under the
statute, and what "sexual contact" and "sexual penetration" en-
tail."1 Some of these terms were alluded to under prior statutes,
but it was left to the courts to construe such terms. It is not clear
that the courts have interpreted them consistently over the
4 Interview with Jan Ben Dor, Coordinator, Michigan Women's Task Force on Rape, in
Ann Arbor, Michigan, October 13, 1974.
5 Id. Jan Ben Dor organized two conferences for rape counselors throughout the state.
She said, "The rape counselors would counsel a victim only to see her 'raped' again in
court."
6 Id. In response to Jan Ben Dor's request for assistance, the Committee said they had a
full calendar but would look at whatever the women's group could present.
7 Virginia Nordby, Lecturer in Law, University of Michigan Law School, and several
women law students worked on the legislative drafting effort.
8 Legislators especially instrumental in sponsoring this bill and taking effective action to
see that it was passed include Senator Gary Byker, R-Hudsonville, and Representative
Earl Nelson, D-Lansing.
9 See Generally Michigan Women's Task Force on Rape Newsletter, July 22, 1974,
available from Jan Ben Dor, 508 Packard, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104.
10 Interview with Virginia Nordby, Lecturer in Law, University of Michigan, in Ann
Arbor, Michigan, September 16, 1974.
11 Sexual Assault Act, § 520a.
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years.12 While the newly codified definitions may be open to
charges of "ambiguity" under certain circumstances, the defini-
tions are nonetheless needed to delineate the contours and fringe
areas of the prohibited acts. Certainly they are a preferable al-
ternative to the vague concept of "carnal knowledge," which was
the prevailing standard-under the old law.'
3
B. Consolidation
In passing the Sexual Assault Act, the legislature has in-
cidentally effected a much needed consolidation and simplification
of widely dispersed statutory provisions covering the problem.
Nine existing statutes have been repealed and substantially in-
corporated in the new Act: the statutory formulations of common
law rape ("unlawful carnal knowledge"),14 assault with intent to
commit rape' 5 or sodomy or gross indecency,
6 attempted rape, 17
indecent liberties,' 8 carnal knowledge of a female ward by guard-
ian,' 9 incest, 20 debauchery of youth, 21 and ravishment of a female
patient in an institution for the insane.22 Many of the latter provi-
sions have been removed from the statutory section on indecency
and immorality23 and, in recognition of the fact that they are more
closely linked to acts of assault than to acts of public indecency,
are now covered by the new criminal provisions. Left intact are
12 Compare People v. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427 (1865) (sexual intercourse with a woman
shown to be in a state of dementia-a mental state approaching idiocy-held not to
constitute rape) with Hirdes v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 180 Mich. 321, 146 N.W. 646 (1914)
(defendant, who gave a woman whiskey causing her to be intoxicated, and then had
intercourse with her, found guilty of rape).
13 MICH. COMp. LAWS § 750.520 (1967):
any person who shall ravish and carnally know any female of the age of 16
years or more by force and against her will ... shall be guilty of a felony....
14 Id.
15 Id. § 750.85.
16 
Id. Consensual sodomy is still a crime. MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 750.158-.159 (1967).
17 Id. § 767.82.
18 Id. § 750.336.
19 Id. § 750.342.
20 Id. § 750.333. Some aspects of the existing unrepealed law and the new sexual assault
act remain irreconcilable. Under § 551.3 and § 551.4, which were not repealed, a marriage
is void if the couple has enough consanguinity for the relationship to amount to incest. Yet,
if the marriage is solemnized outside the state, the marriage will be recognized when the
couple returns. Toth v. Toth, 50 Mich. App. 150, 212 N.W.2d 812 (1973). However.
under the new Sexual Assault Act, sexual intercourse between people with the requisite
degree of consanguity is prohibited only if one or both parties is less than sixteen years
old. Sexual Assault Act, § 520b(l)(b). In that case, the act is punished as an aggravated
offense under § 520b, even if no force or coercion is used. One might question the wisdom
of legislation which decriminalizes the sexual act in an "incestuous relationship" but which
invalidates the marriages of such couples.
21 MICH. COMp. LAWS § 750.339 (1967).
22 
ld. 750.341.
23 Id. §§ 750.335-.347.
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those activities more aptly described as acts of public immorality
or indecency such as self-exposure or the vending of obscene
materials24
It should also be noted that the new law can be described as"sex-neutral"-extending protection to men as well as to wom-
en.2 5 If the Equal Rights Amendment becomes part of the Con-
stitution, the Sexual Assault Act should not be affected.
C. Degrees of Offenses
The new statute includes a hierarchy of degrees which relate to
the severity of the criminal act involved. The advantage of this
hierarchy is that it allows a jury to find a defendant guilty of an
appropriate lesser offense in non-aggravated rape or sexual con-
tact cases. 2 6 Under prior Michigan law, the "minor" rape offenses
included assault, assault and battery, and assault with intent to
commit rape. 27 Only the latter was a felony. 28 This framework left
large gaps between the highest charge and the less severe
offenses. Thus, where a prosecutor plea-bargained or a jury de-
clined to convict a defendant of rape, the less severe offenses
often bore little relationship to the crime committed.29 The result
was that juries often refused to convict a defendant of rape unless
aggravating circumstances were present.30
The new degree structure offers the courts objective guidelines
for matching the crime with the offensiveness of the actor's con-
duct; the lower level offenses in the new law constitute an appro-
24 Id.
25 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520 (rape) defined the crime only in terms of carnal
knowledge of a female. Sexual Assault Act § 520b.(1) implies that the actor may be either
male or female and that the victim may be any person.
26 See Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REv. 680, 681
(1966):
In a carefully drawn code, types of conduct which differ materially from each
other should not be susceptible of being treated as one offense. Different
conduct should be treated differently.
27 People v. Phillips, 385 Mich. 30, 187 N.W.2d 211 (1971); People v. Pary, 14 Mich.
App. 281, 165 N.W.2d 336 (1968).
2- MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 750.81, 750.85 (1970).
If the defense asks for ajury instruction on lesser included offenses, it is error for the
court to refuse to so charge. People v. Jones, 273 Mich. 430, 263 N.W. 417 (1935). The
defense does ask for such a charge in the overwhelming majority of cases. Telephone
interview with John Hensel, Prosecutor, Washtenaw County, Michigan, in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, September 30, 1974.
30 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 253 (1966). "The result is startling.
The jury convicts of rape in just 3 of 42 cases of simple rape." The authors also observed
that
The jury's stance is not so much that involuntary intercourse under these
[non-aggravated] circumstances is no crime at all, but rather does not have




priate mid-point between the old extremes of rape and mere
assault.
1. Penetration-Contact Distinction-The four degrees of crimi-
nal sexual conduct set out in the new law are distinguished on two
general grounds: (1) whether sexual penetration, as opposed to
contact, occurred; 31 and (2) whether certain forceful elements
were present in the commission of the crime. 32 Penetration 33 is
required for first and third degree criminal sexual conduct, where-
as the second and fourth degree provisions apply only to sexual
contact.34 The new statute reflects traditional notions of blame-
worthiness; sexual penetration is deemed to be a more serious
crime than sexual contact. The statute applies to an actor who
engages in penetration, and therefore would include situations in
which the victim was forced to penetrate the actor in some man-
ner.
2. Aggravating Circumstances-The statute further separates
penetration and sexual contact into higher and lower offenses,
depending upon whether certain aggravating circumstances are
present. The fourth degree offense, 35 the only misdemeanor clas-
sification, includes engaging in sexual contact with any person
through the use of force or coercion or where the actor has reason
to know that the victim is mentally or physically incapable of
refusing consent. An offense is categorized as third degree crimi-
nal sexual conduct if the actor engages in penetration and either
force is used or the victim is helpless. 36 It is also third degree
conduct to engage in penetration with a victim who is between the
ages of thirteen and sixteen, whether force is used or not.3 7
31 Compare the Sexual Assault Act §§ 520b and 520d with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 520c and 520e.
32 See notes 35-44 and accompanying text infra.
33 Sexual Assault Act § 520a(h):
"Sexual penetration" means sexual intercourse, cunniligus, fellatio, anal in-
tercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's
body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's
body, but emission of semen is not required.
34 Sexual Assault Act § 520a(g):
"Sexual contact" includes the intentional touching of the victim's or actor's
intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the imme-
diate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts, if that intentional touching
can reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification.
31 Sexual Assault Act § 520e. "Force" is defined to include (I) the application of
physical force, (2) coercion of the victim by threats of violence, (3) coercion by threats of
future retaliation, (4) fraudulent medical treatment or examination of the victim, or (5)
overcoming the victim through concealment or surprise. Id., § 520b(I)(f)(i)-(v).
36 Id. § 520d.
37 Id. § 520d(l)(a). The treatment of statutory age relationships under the new law may
be inconsistent with the concept of grading each offense according to the blameworthiness
FALL 1974]
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It is the existence of certain aggravating circumstances that will
-aise an offensive sexual act-otherwise a third degree offense-to
first degree and which can raise the fourth degree misdemeanor to
a second degree felony. For purposes of discussion these first and
second degree provisions will be referred to as "aggravated
offenses." The actor is guilty of the charged aggravated offense if
any of the following listed elements is present.
Statutory age or relationship.3 8 There are two situations in
which the age of the victim is the aggravating factor. The first is
any circumstance in which the victim was under the age of thir-
teen years, and the second is the case in which the actor either
lives with, is related to, or is in a postition of authority over a
victim who is between the ages of thirteen and sixteen years.
Other felonies.39 If the actor commits any other felony in
connection with the sexual conduct or shortly before or after the
sexual act, the offense is of the higher degree. Thus, an armed
robber who commits rape is subject to first degree penalties. More
questionable might be the situation where an unrelated felony is
committed shortly after a rape.
Use of weapons.40 The attendant use of a weapon likewise
raises the charge to the aggravated offense. It is important to note
that the assailant does not have to employ an actual weapon; it is
sufficient if the victim reasonably believes it to be a dangerous
weapon.
Aiders and abetters.41The presence of aiders or abetters will
also result in the higher penalty. Absent any indication to the
contrary, aiders and abetters will be defined in light of prior
common law decisions. 42 Evidently this category includes all
gang-rape situations.
Personal injury.43 The further aggravating factor is the infliction
of "personal injury" during the sexual act. This term is defined in
the statute as "bodily injury, disfigurement, mental anguish,
of the actor's conduct. For example, a fifteen-year-old female who represents that she is
older will expose her unknowing eighteen-year-old companion to a possible fifteen-year
prison sentence if they have intercourse, but a thirty-year-old man who has intercourse
with a sixteen-year-old is guilty of no crime under the statute.
38 Id. §§ 520b(l)(a) and (b) and §§ 520c(l)(a) and (b).
39 Id. § 520b(I)(c) and § 520c(l)(c).
40 Id. § 520b(I)(e) and § 520c(I)(e).
41 Id. § 520b(l)(d) and § 520c(l)(d).
42 See, e.g., People v. Burrel, 253 Mich. 321, 235 N.W. 170 (1931); People v. Chapman,
62 Mich. 280, 28 N.W.89 (1886); Strang v. People, 24 Mich. 1 (1871).
43 Sexual Assault Act § 520b(l)(g) and § 520c(l)(g).
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chronic pain, pregnancy, disease, or loss or impairment of a
sexual or reproductive organ." 44
D. Penalties
The penalties in the new law were intended to match the
gravity of the offense committed. First degree conduct carries a
maximum of life in prison,45 second and third degree offenses are
punishable with a maximum of fifteen years,46 and fourth degree
conduct is a misdemeanor carrying a maximum two-year sentence
or a fine not exceeding $500.
47
However, because the law specifies no graded minimum sen-
tences, it will be possible for some lesser offenders to receive
longer sentences than some higher degree offenders. While this
arguably undermines the intent of the new degree structure, it
might be justified in certain cases. 48
II1. THE EVIDENTIARY PROVISIONS
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Sexual Assault Act
will be the new evidentiary provisions and the shifted burdens of
proof therein. The new law does not require the victim to resist
the actor49 nor does it require the victim's testimony to be cor-
roborated.50 The prosecution is required to prove that force was
used, 51 but it does not have to prove the victim's nonconsent. 2
Consent is now an affirmative defense in certain situations, 53 but
the use of the victim's past sexual conduct to prove consent is
severely limited.
54
The following sections will investigate the possible bases for
44 Id. § 520a(f). Given the legislature's apparent intent to distinguish aggravated situ-
ations from the simpler cases (i.e., forcible rape per se) it may be assumed that something
more than a slight injury would be necessary to elevate a penetration offense to the first
degree, but this is not specified in the statute. Interview with Virginia Nordby, Lecturer in
Law, University of Michigan Law School, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, September 16, 1974.
45 Sexual Assault Act § 520b(2).
46 Id. § 520c(2), § 520d(2).
47 Id. § 520e(2).
4" For example, sexual conduct by a third-time offender might warrant a longer sentence
than penetration by a first-time offender. And a case of sexual contact with infliction of
injury might be deemed more heinous in some contexts than a case of penetration at
gunpoint with no injury.
49 Sexual Assault Act § 520i.
50 Id. § 520h.
51 Id. § 520b(l)(f).
52 Id. § 520j.
53 See note 73 infra. Obviously the defense of consent is precluded where the victim is
under the statutory age or is mentally incapacitated.
51 Id. § 520j(l)(a), (b), and § 520j(2).
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former evidentiary provisions and the reasons for the changes
noted above.
A. Evidentiary Policy and the Mythology of Rape
The manner in which burdens of proof are allocated between
the prosecution and the defense in criminal trials is based largely
on generally accepted policy considerations. Likewise, the need
for and creation of presumptions is also based on policy choices.
These policy choices are, in turn, based on the perception, both of
the judiciary and the public at large, of what is fair, what is
expected, what is normal, or what is likely. These machinations
established the presumptions and allocated the burdens of proof
under the old rape laws.
Unfortunately it now appears that the perceptions of the
judiciary and the public on which these presumptions were based
were themselves grounded to some extent on the mythology rath-
er than the reality of rape.
1. Rape as a crime of passion or lust.-Recent studies make it
clear that rape is a crime of violence. 55 It is committed by actors
who are not primarily moved by passion or even lust; rather, the
actors are primarily motivated by hostility and the urge to bruta-
lize and humiliate their victims. 56 A major study of forcible rape
showed that in 85 percent of all reported rapes there was some
form of overt violence such as beating or choking. 57
2. Rape as a provoked reaction to victim's behavior.- Rape is
not a crime in which a person's passion is provoked uncon-
trollably by a woman who subtly consents to intercourse through
her manner ("body language") or dress. Eighty-two percent of all
rapes are planned or partly planned in advance with regard to
either the intended victim or the intent to perpetrate a rape.
58
55 See FBI REPORTS, supra note 2 at 13.
56 MICHIGAN TASK FORCE ON RAPE, BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR A PROPOSAL FOR
CRIMINAL CODE REFORM TO RESPOND TO MICHIGAN'S RAPE CRISIS, 1973, at 2.57 M. AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE, at 152-53 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Amir].
The data in Amir's study is derived from Philadelphia police reports from 1958 and 1968.
In his study elements of force are broken down into component factors: roughness, 28.5
percent; brutal beating, (slugging, kicking, using fists), 20.4 percent; nonbrutal beating
(slapping), 24.7 percent; choking or gagging, 11.5 percent. Nonphysical violence or force
consisting of coercion (victim threatened with bodily harm), 24.9 percent; intimidation
(physical gestures and verbal threats), 41.2 percent; intimidation with a weapon or object,
21.1 percent.
58 Id. at 141-42. The study generalizes that in a planned rape, the place was arranged,
enticement was employed or the victim was deliberately sought, and a plan was made to
coerce her into sexual relations. In a partially planned rape, vague plans were made
hastily, after the offender had encountered the victim and the situation seemed "ripe."
[VOL. 8:217
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Forty-three percent of all rapes are gang rapes involving two or
more attackers with a single victim.59 The Federal Commission
on Crimes of Violence reports that only a low percentage of rapes
involve any precipitative behavior on the part of the woman, such
as gestures or style of dress. 60 Yet studies indicated that juries are
strongly influenced by the behavior of the victim. Despite in-
structions by the judge, juries often respond as though they were
applying the legal theory of assumption of risk.
n1
3. Rape as a pleasurable experience. 2-That such an asser-
tion could be believed is incredible; however, such a representa-
tion or belief may be a key part of the defense strategy. That there
is a vast physiological difference between the concept of normal
intercourse and rape is perhaps best understood by the studies of
Masters and Johnson. 63 Certainly, in light of the percentages of
cases involving beating or choking,64 the belief that rape is plea-
surable is unreasonable.
As medical, sociological, and psychological studies progressed,
the foundation of the presumptions in the old rape laws became
less firm. The following sections explore four particular provisions
in detail.
B. Force and Resistance
Under the old statute a defendant could be convicted of rape
59 Id. at 193. In gang rapes, Amir suggests there are two types of victims: (1) "loose"
women, who are raped by actors who may be motivated by the assumption that the
victim's reputation will render her complaint ineffective; and (2) "accidental" victims of
unknown reputation who merely happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.
However, 95 percent of gang rapes are planned or partially planned, a statistic which is
probably accounted for by the fact that a secure place must be found and a victim sought
and agreed upon. Id. at 143.
6OSee Curtis, Victim Participation and Violent Crime, 21 SOCIAL PROBLEMS, 600
(1974). The National Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence reported that
only 4 percent of all rapes in 1967 involved such conduct. In Amir's study 18 percent of
the victim precipitated the rape (e.g., the victim consented and then retracted her consent,
did not resist strongly enough when a suggestion of intercourse was made, or used
indecent language or gestures that could be taken as an invitation to sexual relations).
Amir, supra note 57 at 266. Id. at 929 n.95 (suggesting that a bias in judging the existence
of precipitative behavior may be inherent to the predominately male population of police,
prosecutors, and judges).
61 H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY, at 249-257 (1966). The jury often
weighs the woman's behavior in determining the defendant's guilt, especially of the victim
has been hitchhiking, drinking, divorced, or had illegitimate children; this is so even when
the victim is seriously hurt or gang-raped.
62 See S. FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS 158 (Sprount's
trans. 1933). But see Note, Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81
YALE L.J. 1376-1378 (1972).
63 Masters, The Sexual Response of the Human Female, WESTERN JOURNAL OF SUR-
GERY, OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, Vol. 68, 1960, at 57-72. The author found that an
excitement phase, at least several minutes in duration and caused by physical stimulation,
was almost always a necessary prerequisite to orgasm in the female.
64 See note 57 and accompanying text, supra.
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only if the prosecution proved the use of force by the assailant
and the unwillingness of the victim. 65 This requirement was con-
strued by Michigan courts to mean that the victim had to resist
the actor "from the inception to the close,"66 and such resistance
had "to be to the utmost." 67 The resistance standard was devel-
oped as an objective test of whether the carnal knowledge was
"against the will" of the victim, 68 but the standard has been
attacked on several grounds. Rape has been the only violent crime
which required any level of resistance by the victim. 6 9 Thus, the
victim was called upon to risk his or her life in order to make
conviction possible. This requirement contradicts the advice of
police, who counsel victims of sexual assault to avoid resisting the
actors where such resistance would not be to the victim's advan-
tage in attempting to escape.
70
Perhaps the most compelling argument is that nonconsent usu-
ally accompanies the use of force; 71 therefore, nonconsent should
be presumed in cases of forcible sexual conduct.
The new statute codifies this view-resistance by the victim is
not an element of the prosecutor's case. 72 Rather, the new law
regards the coercion used by the actor, not the victim's state of
mind, as determinative. While consent may be raised as an
affirmative defense in certain situations, 73 under the new law it is
clearly no longer necessary for the prosecution to prove noncon-
sent.
The new law also presumes nonconsent in the absence of force
when the victim is under the age of sixteen or when the victim is
physically or mentally helpless. 74 The "helpless victim" cases had
65 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520 (1970).
66 People v. Murphy, 145 Mich. 524, 528, 108 N.W. 1009, 1011 (1906).
67 People v. Geddes, 301 Mich. 258, 261, 3 N.W.2d 266, 267 (1942). ,
18 See Note, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, supra note 26 at 682: "[the
courts] have seized upon resistance, the outward manifestation of nonconsent, as the
device for determining whether the woman actually gave consent."
69 Nonconsent is not an element of the crimes of assault (MICH. COMP. LAWS
§750.81-90 (1970)), larceny from a person (ld. §750.357), or homicide (id.
§ 750.316-.326). Accordingly, courts have not required victim resistance.
70 Interview with Katherine Lesney, Executive Lieutenant, Women and Children's
Section, Detroit, Michigan Police Department, in Detroit, Nov. 20, 1974. The department
recommends resistance as affording the victim a chance to escape, except where she is
confronted with a weapon or other hopeless odds.
71 Nonconsent would not accompany force in the exceptionally aberrant case of a
sado-masochistic relationship.
72 Sexual Assault Act § 520i.
73 Id., §§ 520j(l), (a), (b), and (2). The word "consent" does not appear in the new law at
all. However, the clear implication of § 520j, inter alia, is that sexual acts accomplished by
force or coercion are the antithesis of voluntary sexual acts; for a sexual act to be
voluntary, there must be conscious consent by both participants.
74 Id. § 520d.
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presented a problem under the prior statute which required proof
of both force and nonconsent, 75 but Michigan courts evolved tests
that achieved roughly the same result as the new law, 76 holding
the actor liable if he knew or had reason to know of the victim's
condition.
In recent years the Michigan courts have relaxed the resistance
requirement. The early judicial stance was that there could be no
conviction for rape if the prosecutrix ceased to resist at any point
before consummation of intercourse. 77 However, more recent
cases have excused nonresistance if the victim "was overcome by
fear of the defendant." 78 This rationale has been used most often
in cases of gang rapes 79 and rapes at gunpoint,80 but has also been
applied recently where the actor had no weapon and was acting
alone. 8 •Thus, the new provision regarding resistance may reflect
the current judicial view.
C. The Victim's Sexual Conduct
The Sexual Assault Act now limits the admissibility of evi-
dence to the specific circumstances of the charged criminal act
and excludes evidence of the victim's chastity, sexual reputation,
and sexual conduct. 82 There are only two exceptions: evidence of
prior sexual activity with the actor and evidence of specific in-
stances of sexual activity to show the origin of pregnancy, dis-
ease, or semen. 83 However, this evidence will only be admitted
after the defense has filed a written motion and offer of proof
within ten days after arraignment, 4 and the judge has determined
that the evidence is material and that its probative value out-
weighs its inflammatory nature.8
In the past, such evidence was allowed either to impeach the
victim's credibility or to show the probability that she consented.
75 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.341 (1970).
76 People v. Don Moran, 25 Mich. 356, 363, 12 Am. Rep. 283 (1872) stating that
overcoming a victim's resistance through the use of drugs was equivalent to the use of
physical force).
77 People v. Ayres, 195 Mich. 274, 161 N.W. 870 (1917); People v. Marrs, 125 Mich.
376, 84 N.W. 284 (1900) (dictum).
78 People v. Myers, 306 Mich. 100, 103, 10 N.w.2d 323, 324 (1943).
79 People v. Jackson, 42 Mich. App. 468, 202 N.W.2d 463 (1972); People v. Dockery,
20 Mich. App. 201, 173 N.w.2d 726 (1969).
80 People v. Myers, 306 Mich. 100, 10 N.w.2d 323 (1943).
81 People v. Palmer, 47 Mich. App. 512, 209 N.W.2d 710 (1973).
82 Sexual Assault Act § 520j.
83 Id. §§ 520j(l)(a) and (b).
84 Id. § 520j(2).
85 Id. § 520j(1).
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These two purposes are quite separate, although their effects may
merge. Where the premise is accepted that women who have
consented in the past will probably consent in the future, the
defense can cross-examine the victim on her past sexual history
and present witnesses to show the probability that she consented.
Similarly, impeachment is used to suggest that the victim is lying,
and not to be believed.86 With regard to that hypothesis, genera
evidence of a bad reputation or specific sexual activities have
been allowed, but evidence of specific acts with third parties have
not been admissable except to show the origiri of a pregnancy.
7
The new act attempts to focus the attention of the court on the
criminal act and its circumstances. In the past it was believed that
the protection of the defendant from untrue accusations required
that all means be put at his disposal to determine the veracity of
the accusations, including evidence of the prosecutrix's past his-
tory."" However, this evidence served as a strong deterrent to
reporting and prosecuting rapes, 9 victims being reluctant to sub-
mit to a harrowing trial.90 Since this deterrent effect could pose a
large problem, an exception was created, limited by the judge's
discretion, to allow the admission of evidence of prior relations
between the actor and the victim.91 The exception, while more
limited than in the past, is still open to abuse. The court must
protect the defendant from false accusations and simultaneously
protect the victim from having mere acquaintanceship or physical
proximity construed as consent to sexual conduct.9 2 The second
exception, allowing evidence of specific instances of sexual activ-
ity to show the source of semen, pregnancy, or disease, also
86 People v. McClean, 71 Mich. 309, 38 N.W. 917 (1888) (evidence that prosecutrix's
character for chastity is bad held admissable, and particular acts of unchastity or sexual
intercourse with the defendant allowed to be shown, but evidence of such acts with a third
person held not admissible). Cf People v. Travis, 246 Mich. 514, 516, 224 N.W. 329, 330
(1929) (admission of evidence that a third person had not had sexual relations with his wife
for four years and would be more inclined to commit rape than one whose sexual desires
had regularly been satisfied held reversible error).
87 People v. Russell, 241 Mich. 125, 126-27, 216 N.W. 441, 442 (1927) (Where the
prosecutrix is pregnant, the defendant should be permitted to establish either by direct or
circumstantial evidence that someone other than himself may be responsible for that
condition.). See also People v. Mitchel, 44 Mich. App. 679, 685, 689-90, 205 N.W.2d 876,
879,881 (1973).
88 Landau, Rape: The Victim as Defendant, TRIALS, July-Aug. 1974 at 19:
[Ojur rape laws express both our deep revulsion at this crime and our equally
deep distrust of those women who accuse another human being of having
committed it.
89 See FBI REPORTS, supra note 2, at 13.
90 See notes 4-5 supra.
91 Sexual Assault Act §§ 520j(l)(a), and (b).
92 Sexual Assault Act § 520(I).
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appears vulnerable to abuse, but it is designed to protect the
defendant's rights. If the identity of the actor is at issue, the
defendant must be permitted to admit evidence showing that a
third party was the source of the semen. Likewise, since preg-
nancy and venereal disease are types of "personal injury" that
would elevate a simple offense to the aggravated level, the defend-
ant must be allowed to admit such evidence to show his innocence
as to the pregnancy or disease.
It has been argued that the evidentiary limitations provided for
in the new law (i.e., total exclusion of any testimony of prior
sexual relations between the victim and third parties) abridge the
defendant's constitutional right to due process and to con-
frontation. Admitting such evidence may be logically relevant,
(i.e., that the existence of A makes it more likely that B has
occurred), the legislature has, in the new law, determined that this
testimony is not legally relevant.
Courts have in numerous circumstances, where overriding pol-
icy considerations were at stake, totally excluded evidence which
may be logically relevant but which is held as a matter of law not
to be legally relevant. An example is the case of subsequent
repairs made to a facility which may have caused an injury? 3
Presently, in many jurisdictions, it is clear error for a trial court
judge to admit such evidence. 94 The analogy of this example to
the statutory rule excluding evidence of a victim's prior sexual
conduct with third parties is compelling. In cases involving evi-
dence of subsequent repair, the courts evolved a fixed rule of law
through "policy-balancing" in individual cases: in the Sexual As-
sault Act, the legislature enacted a fixed rule of law after it
balanced the countervailing policies for and against admission of
such evidence. The distinction between the two law-making pro-
cesses is probably too slight to support a finding that one is
constitutionally valid and the other is not.
'P Although such repairs may logically be relevant to the issue of prior defective
condition and negligence, the courts have uniformly excluded such evidence. See Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 407, Subsequent Remedial Measures, F. R. EvID. (1973).
Apparently this was initially a discretionary judgment of the court which, in each case,
weighed the policy for encouraging such repairs against the probative value of the evi-
dence. As similar cases arose and the courts relied more heavily on past decisions holding
against admission of the evidence, the issue became less discretionary and more a formal
common-law rule. See Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS
L.REv. 574 (1956).
94 Falknor, supra, note 93.
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D. Corroboration
Although some states require that the victim's testimony be
corroborated by other evidence of one or more of the elements of
nonconsent, penetration, or identity of the assailant,9 5 neither the
Michigan common law nor the existing statutes have required
corroboration of the victim's testimony.9 6 The law relies com-
pletely on the jury to weigh the credibility of each witness, and
this rule is continued under the new law.
97
However, even in Michigan, where corroboration never has
been officially required, few defendants have been convicted with-
out some corroborative evidence.98 An unofficial corroboration
rule may exist in practice where overloaded police departments
and prosecutors' offices refuse to press a case without some in-
dependent evidentiary support for the victim's testimony?9 In
doubtful cases the complaining party is often required to take a
polygraph test.100
There are several reasons advanced in favor of the corrobora-
tion requirement. One is the theory that rape is more likely to be
falsely charged than other crimes. Coupled with this are the
beliefs that juries are prejudiced in favor of the victim and that
defendants need extra protection in rape cases because there is
seldom an eyewitness available to refute the victim's testimony. 10 1
Empirical data on the relative veracity of rape reports, as
opposed to reports of other crimes, has not been compiled,102 but
there is evidence that only a small percentage of rapes are report-
95 See Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (1967).
96 People v. Miller, 96 Mich. 119, 55 N.W. 675 (1893); People v. Lawson, 34 Mich.
App. 620, 192 N.W.2d 60 (1971).
97Sexual Assault Act § 520h.
98 Many of the Michigan opinions enunciating the no-corroboration rule must be taken
only as dicta: while espousing the rule, they have gone on to cite the corroborating
evidence. See e.g., People v. Borowski, 330 Mich. 120, 47 N.W.2d 42 (1951); People v.
Inman, 315 Mich. 456, 24 N.W.2d 176 (1946); People v. Coffman, 45 Mich. App. 480,
206 N.W.2d 795 (1973).
9 Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J.
1365, 1382:
In not one of the seventy-two rape cases encountered in their [Kalven and
Zeisel] sample did prosecution rely only on the testimony of the complainant.
100 Interview with Mrs. Diana Davis, Washtenaw County Sheriffs Department in Ann
Arbor, Michigan, August 30, 1974.
101 See Note, supra note 95, at 1139.
1
0 2 Note, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919, 928
(1973):
in California, one fifth. of the rape complaints are "unfounded," as far as the
police are concerned. This does not mean that the rapes did not occur. The
police "unfind" a complaint when they feel the evidence is not strong enough
to obtain a conviction.
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ed.' 03 It has been noted that the many disincentives for reporting
a rape tend to discourage frivolous reports. 10 4 Also, the studies
conducted by Kalven and Zeisel 10 5 indicate that juries are not
prejudiced against the defendant; indeed, there is great reluctance
on their part to convict if the parties had previously known each
other.
There is some validity to the argument that identification
should be corroborated,10 6 but the identification problem exists in
all facets of criminal law and arguably can best be handled by the
traditional "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. There is reason
to believe that modern criminal investigation techniques, tradi-
tional legal rules, and disincentives to reporting are sufficient in
weeding out false complaints,' 0 7 whereas strict corroboration re-
quirements allow many guilty parties to go free.' 08 The rule also
presents a constitutional problem of equal protection for women,
since corroboration is required only in rape cases. 10 9
For these reasons, the Michigan legislature quite properly ex-
cluded any corroboration requirement from the statute. It remains
to be seen whether the bill will have any effect on law enforce-
ment agencies which tend to require independent supporting evi-
dence before proceeding with a case.
IV. OTHER REFORM FEATURES
A. Suppression of Names and Evidence
Under the new law, the names of the victim and the actor as
well as details of the offense can be suppressed at the request of
counsel, the actor, or the victim until the actor is arraigned on
information, the charge is dismissed, or the case is otherwise
concluded. 110 Similar protection is afforded to juveniles; the juve-
nile court in Michigan can not disclose court records unless there
103 Id. at 921: "Various studies have estimated that only 20 percent of all forcible rapes
are reported to police." (Footnotes omitted.)
104 See Note, supra note 99. Complaintants face an often embarrassing police in-
terrogation, grueling cross-examination from defense counsel, and poor odds for a con-
viction.
105 See H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, supra note 61, at 253.
106 See II AMER. CRIM. LAW REV. 309, 313 (1973).
107 See Note, supra note 99, at 1375.
108 Id. at 1370. Although the judicial rule was well settled in Michigan, codification was
necessary to make it clear that the legislature did not intend any change in this area.
Interview with Virginia Nordby, Lecturer in Law, University of Michigan Law School, in
Ann Arbor, Michigan, September 1, 1974.
109 Supra, note 99 at 1371.
110 Sexual Assault Act § 520k.
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is a "legitimate interest."'" Although newspapers are not prohib-
ited from publishing the names of juvenile offenders if they can
obtain the names through other sources such as police records,
they generally do not do so.112 Newspapers have also established
a policy of not publishing the names of rape victims. 113 These
policies suggest the obvious: that there is a stigma attached to
juvenile offenders and to rape victims as well, since they are
treated in a similar manner. Consistent with these policies, the
Sexual Assault Act appears to be a preliminary device to protect
the parties from unnecessary distress through the publishing or
broadcasting of their identities.
However, "suppression" may imply that no one, not even the
defendant, will have access to information prior to arraignment. If
this is the legislative intent, this section may face constitutional
challenges for depriving defendants of their constitutional rights.
A similar Georgia statute11 4 presently under attack only prohibits
the name of the victim from ever being published or broadcast but
does not withhold the evidence from the defendant. Under the
first interpretation where only publishing or broadcasting is pro-
hibited, the new Michigan law is apt to be viewed uncritically, but
the latter interpretation involving suppression of names and evi-
dence may face serious challenge.115
B. Husband and Wife
The common law definition of rape required unlawful carnal
knowledge. 116 A husband could not be guilty of raping his wife,
since the marital relationship was sanctioned by the law. This still
would be true under the Sexual Assault Act unless the spouses
1I Micti. COMP. LAWS § 712A.28 (1968). See People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 10
N.w.2d 303 (1943); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Oakland Co. Probate Judges, 50
Mich. App. 31 (1973).
112 Interview with David Bishop, Managing Editor, Ann Arbor News in Ann Arbor,
Michigan, September 30, 1974. The policy of the News, like that of many other news-
papers, is not to publish names of juvenile offenders.113 1d.
114 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1968). This statute was upheld by the Georgia Supreme
Court in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 200 S.E.2d 127 (1973), appeal
pending, 415 U.S. 912 (No. 73-938 1974).
115 See generally Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
116 I M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628 (1847). See also Note, Rape and Battery
Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 720 (1954). Under the old Michigan
statute, a husband can be charged as a principal in the rape of his wife for aiding and
abetting the rape. There has never been a case in Michigan where the husband was
charged directly with raping his wife. See People v. Chapman, 62 Mich. 280, 28 NW. 896
(1886); Strang v. People, 24 Mich. 1 (1871) (dictum).
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were living apart and one had filed for separate maintenance or
divorce.
117
A person has always been protected against murder and man-
slaughter by his or her spouse, and the new Act seeks to extend
the protection of the law to a limited group of married but sepa-
rated people. 118 The new law, however, still does not protect
spouses with continuing marriages, thus presenting a possible
denial of equal protection" 9 in that only married couples who are
living apart are protected.
There are several considerations that led to the limitation of the
Act's coverage to couples living apart. Acts between a married
couple may provide difficult evidentiary problems. 20 There is a
belief that the situation of spouses living together is susceptible to
misinterpretation and likely to allow either spouse to use the law
to obtain a better property settlement or child custody. 21 It also
might act as an obstacle to reconciliation.1 22 In balance, therefore,
the legislature decided to avoid bringing this difficult evidentiary
and social problem within the scope of the Act.
V. COMPARISONS WITH THE MODEL PENAL CODE
The Model Penal Code (MPG) was promulgated nearly two
decades ago 23 and may be considered obsolete in some areas.' 2 4
It is presented here as an intermediate stage of legal development
on the road from the common law rape offense to the new Mich-
igan law.
Both statutes arrange the offenses into a hierarchy of degrees
according to the seriousness of the act, and both provisions
equate a threat of force with actual force. 2 5 Neither statute
requires resistance by the victim, although the MPC requires
threats to be such as "would prevent the resistance by a woman
117 Sexual Assault Act § 5201.
118 ld.
119 U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
120See Note, supra note 116, at 725. It may be argued, however, that difficult




123 The Sexual Provisions of Model Penal Code Proposed Official Draft (1962) were
originally presented as § 206 Tent. Draft No. 4 (1955).
124 The MPC defines rape in the traditional manner. See Stone and Hall, The Model
Penal Code in Idaho?, 8 IDAHO L. REV. 237 (1972):
The basic change brought about by the Code is not so much with regard to
definition as it is to grade the offense into felonies of three categories.
125 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.l(l)(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); Sexual Assault
Act § 529b(l)(f)(i), (ii).
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of ordinary resolution.' 26 Both laws deal with intercourse by
deceit or with mentally defective victims. 127
The MPC is not sex-neutral and offers no protection to
spouses. Rape may only be committed by a male having in-
tercourse with a female who is not his wife.' 2 8 The MPC also
treats an unmarried couple as man and wife if they are living
together; under that circumstance an unmarried woman would not
be protected under the Act.129 The MPC also requires corrobora-
tion of the victim's testimony and calls for a jury instruction
which implies that the victim's emotional involvement makes her
testimony suspect.'
3 0
The MPC first degree statutory rape age is ten, as opposed to
thirteen in Michigan, and the MPC lesser offense of corruption of
minors applies to women under sixteen provided that the actor is
at least four years older than his victim.' 3 ' The requirement that
the actor be older was not included in the Michigan law because it
was argued that age differential alone does not constitute coer-
cion.' 3
2
Under the MPC the actor would be guilty of a first degree rape
only where he inflicted serious injury on the victim. Nevertheless,
the felony would be reduced to second degree if the actor were a
social companion of the victim at the time of the crime or if the
victim had previously been intimate with the actor.' 33 It would
appear that the MPC has codified the notions of assumption of
risk and relevance of the victim's past sexual history, both of
which should be irrelevant where severe injury is inflicted. The
Michigan degree concept is superior because it reflects the con-
duct of the actor, not of the victim.
The MPC treats a threat of personal injury as an element of
second degree rape, but sexual intercourse through the use of
other "reasonable" threats is only a third degree rape.' 3 4 Mich-
126 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). But see Sexual
Assault Act § 520i.
127 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962); Sexual Assault Act
§ 520d.
128 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
129 Aside from the inequity suffered by unmarried women in this situation, the MPC
formulation is open to numerous interpretative problems. In this age of diverse consensual
relationships between consenting adults, when are couples "living together?"
130 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(6) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
131 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1, 213.3(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The age
of statutory rape was ten in Michigan in 1857. See Crosswell v. People, 13 Mich. 427
(1865).
132 Interview with Virginia Nordby, Lecturer in Law, I niversity of Michigan Law
School, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, September 1, 1974.
133 MODEL PENAL CODE.§ 213.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 62).
134 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1(1), (2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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igan distinguishes between present and future threats but assigns
the same penalty to both.
Instead of grouping all crimes of penetration into one statute, as
Michigan has done, the MPC divided them into "Rape" (between
a man and a woman) and a crime called "Deviate Intercourse"
(between any people).13 5 However, the two MPC provisions con-
tain identical elements.
In Michigan it is not an offense for a guardian to have sexual
relations with his ward aged sixteen to twenty-one, but such
conduct would be a misdemeanor under the MPC. 13 6 Also, the
MPC would make it a misdemeanor for actors to have sexual
intercourse with any person detained in a hospital or in-
stitution.13 7 In Michigan such conduct would not be a crime
unless the victim were under the age of sixteen, in which case it
would constitute a first degree felony.138 The MPC would deem
sexual contact to be merely a misdemeanor, 39 while the Michigan
Act recognizes that sexual contact accompanied by aggravating
factors is more egregious than some penetration acts. Thus, Mich-
igan deems some sexual contact to constitute felonious second
degree conduct.'
40
Reasonable mistake as to the victim's age is a defense to
statutory rape under the MPC, except when the victim is less than
ten years old.14' Michigan does not allow the defense of mistaken
age allowed under the old rape statute.142
Perhaps the best feature of the MPC is that the hierarchy of
offenses is defined in terms of penalties, with the implication that
a major offense would always receive a greater penalty than a
minor offense. As was noted above, the Michigan Act grades the
offenses but allows the penalties to overlap. 143
VII. CONCLUSION
The Michigan Sexual Assault Act reflects a major rethinking of
the common assumptions about rape. Legislation cannot eliminate
135 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 213.1, 213.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
136 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(0)(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
137 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(1)(e) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
138 Sexual Assault Act § 520b(l)(b).
139 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
140 Sexual Assault Act § 520c(I).
141 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
142 People v. Gengels, 218 Mich. 632, 188 N.W. 398 (1922). On the other hand,
mistaken age was a defense to the crime of "debauching." MICH. COMP. LAWS, § 750.339
(1967). See also People v. Bailey, 341 Mich. 592, 67 N.W.2d 785 (1954).
143 See Part II-A supra,
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the various myths that are apparently held by many jurors but the
Act properly directs the court's attention to the level of violence
used, rather than to the victim's prior sexual activity. The legisla-
tion reflects the fact that the motives of the rapist are not primar-
ily sexual and, therefore, traditional ideas about sex do not apply
to the rape situation.
Hopefully, the new Act will encourage the reporting of rapes,
since women will no longer be required to testify about past
relationships. Prosecutors may be less reluctant to handle rape
cases. Also, convictions for nonaggravated rape may increase
because there are now lesser offenses which are matched to less
violent acts. An added advantage of the bill is that rape of a
separated spouse is now a crime, although it could be argued that
spouses should not have to be living apart in order to be covered
by the Act.
The bill may be criticized because it does not limit the felony
status of the aggravated offenses to forcible felonies. The absence
of minimum sentences and the ambiguity concerning the terms
"mental anguish" and "bodily injury" may tend to undercut the
degree structure of the statute. These and other difficulties must
await judicial interpretation before it will be possible to determine
the ultimate effects of the Sexual Assault Act.
. - Kenneth A. Cobb
-Nancy R. Schauer
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